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ETYEN MAHÇUPYAN e.mahcupyan@todayszaman

Where does the actual tension lie?


Political commentators naturally focus on political parties and other players who are influential in politics. They assume social demands are already reflected in this sphere. Therefore, they conclude that it is possible to make sense of society by looking at the political players. However, this parallelism does not apply to countries such as Turkey.

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The translation of social demands and preferences into politics will not only be incomplete and delayed but because there is a tutelary regime in Turkey, the reverse of these demands and preferences tends to lock political debates most of the time. This means that the borders of the political sphere have been drawn in compliance with the official ideology’s definition of acceptable citizens. Thus, some social demands and preferences may be declared illegitimate from their inception, and political parties that aspire to defend them can easily be closed down. It follows that the political actors in Turkey have been domesticated by the state over time and come to be satisfied with the role given to them by the state.

This continues today as well. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) in particular maintains the traditional political party performance. What is unusual is the Justice and Development Party (AK Party). This is because due to the changing conditions in the world and the increased likelihood of the country becoming a member of the European Union, the party’s organization has a structure that is more dependent on society. The AK Party voter base is considerably heterogeneous, and the party has to be careful to maintain its internal balances. On the other hand, at least 25 percent of its voter base is ahead of the AK Party in terms of demands for democratization, freedom and human rights. This rate has continued to grow over the years. Accordingly, as it can be argued that the AK Party is taking society toward democracy through political moves, it can equally be suggested that this party is the result of the mental change of Turkish society toward democratic values.

This scene may give us important clues to understanding recent developments. Indeed, those accustomed to making their analyses based on political players are inclined to see the process that started with the Ergenekon trial as a conflict between the government and the armed forces. There is really a tension attributed to the developments, but this is an effect, not a cause. As a matter of fact, there are a number of indications that imply that the AK Party did not actually intend to clash with the military had the political situation been different and had the military acted otherwise. In other words, the government’s current “unyielding” stance indicates a level that was achieved through learning.

The most important factor in this process was the AK Party’s ability to quickly eliminate the psychological barriers in its mind. On the other hand, these changes were influential not only on the AK Party, but also on the military and the judiciary. A report prepared by a military expert concerning the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) coup seminar held in 2002 reveals that the coup preparations had been made intentionally and their results intentionally concealed from superiors through a fake report. Moreover, the expert also concluded that these minutes of the said meetings should have already been concealed deliberately and at the beginning. In other words, as the Sledgehammer plan was being prepared, some of the officers who are within that network were against the coup and did not raise their voices. But they later decided to take action. Apparently, the change Turkey is going through has split the military into two, and without this split, we could not have learned about the coup attempt.

We can conclude from the developments that a similar split applies to the judiciary as well. In the face of the formation of a class in the top judiciary and its direct intervention in politics, a group of prosecutors and judges who give priority to the requirements of their profession has started to raise its voice. Perhaps they already existed in the past, but, as in the case of the military, they had to wait for the suitable time.

Social change has affected not only the AK Party but also the military and the judiciary. This division was not only about the distance from the official ideology but also about the adherence to professional ethics. Thus, both institutions gave rise to groups that do not approve of the tutelary regime in Turkey or their institutions meddling in politics and that seek to ensure that their professional career is not shaped based on politics. The ongoing tension cannot be understood without taking into consideration these institutional divisions. The AK Party is less a factor that creates this process and more a political player that benefits from it. It is for this reason that it is virtually impossible to stop the process of democratization because it’s no longer enough just to close down a party.

12 March 2010, Friday
ETYEN MAHÇUPYAN
   
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Other Articles of the Columnist

  Where does the actual tension lie?
  Why is the military in a paralyzed condition?
  The last days of Pompeii
  Turkey unable to assimilate the protocols
  Counterrevolution
  Psychological threshold
  The regime’s disease
  Critical step
  Modern synthesis
  Normalization a la Turca
  Multiple balances
  Is the PKK changing?
  After the DTP...
  Which sensitivity?
  Why is Erdoğan feared?
  Is the AK Party changing its orientation?
  Turkey’s new axis
  The party of the collapsing center politics
  Who holds the strings in the Kurdish opening?
  What if the military loses balance?
Columnists
ABDULHAMİT BİLİCİ
ABDULLAH BOZKURT
ALİ BULAÇ
ALİ H. ASLAN
AMANDA PAUL
ANDREW FINKEL
ASIM ERDİLEK
AYŞE KARABAT
BEJAN MATUR
BERİL DEDEOĞLU
BERK ÇEKTİR
BÜLENT KENEŞ
BÜLENT KORUCU
CHARLOTTE MCPHERSON
DOĞU ERGİL
EKREM DUMANLI
EMRE USLU
ETYEN MAHÇUPYAN
FATMA DİŞLİ ZIBAK
FİKRET ERTAN
GÜRKAN ZENGİN
HASAN KANBOLAT
HÜSEYİN GÜLERCE
İBRAHİM KALIN
İBRAHİM ÖZTÜRK
İHSAN DAĞI
İHSAN YILMAZ
KATHY HAMILTON
KERİM BALCI
KLAUS JURGENS
LALE KEMAL
MEHMET KAMIŞ
MICHAEL KUSER
MUHAMMED ÇETİN
MÜMTAZER TÜRKÖNE
NICOLE POPE
ÖMER TAŞPINAR
ORHAN KEMAL CENGİZ
PAT YALE
ŞAHİN ALPAY
SELÇUK GÜLTAŞLI
SUAT KINIKLIOĞLU
YAVUZ BAYDAR