He repeated this demand during his chat with journalists at the Central Orduevi on Aug. 30. The relevant sentence he uttered at the War Academies Command was clear: While stressing that the professional character of the military profession should be respected, he said, "The military should be given autonomy to a large extent so that it can organize itself." The phrases he voiced during the reception on Aug. 30 were more natural: "The unity and integrity of the armed forces is very important. For this reason, the Constitution, the law and democracy [should be viewed as autonomous], of course. ... But you should [also] view the armed forces as autonomous. The armed forces will be above everything, and of course, it will be united." These are words that deserve careful analysis.What will be the use of a military that will be held "above everything" in the country? A better defense? More power and prestige in the international arena? What about the demand for "autonomy"? Is giving it "autonomy to a large extent" really necessary for the military to perform its duties? Whom is this demand for autonomy made to? From whom will the military be autonomous?
Autonomous from whom?
As in European Union countries, there are autonomous public institutions in Turkey. All of them are administrative review institutions. The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK), the Energy Market Regulatory Agency (EPDK), the Public Procurement Board (KİK) and others conduct public inspection duties autonomously from the government.
Başbuğ's demand for autonomy is considerably different from the autonomy enjoyed by these institutions. The military's demand for autonomy means a demand for being immune from review. The military seeks to restrict the government's political review, Parliament's legislative review and the judiciary's legal review, which currently apply to it. It follows that the demand for autonomy means the privilege of being immune from review or inspection. Why does the military want to escape inspection?
Actually, the TSK already enjoys considerable autonomy, as guaranteed by the Constitution and other laws. The extensive powers and authority of the military judiciary are major components of this autonomy. During the Ergenekon trial, this extensive authority has been frequently discussed. Within the larger judicial system, the military judiciary provides military personnel immunity, which is not available to other citizens. Essentially, the military judiciary is not independent. The military prosecutors get their orders from the garrison commanders. The military judges do not enjoy the guarantees or protection afforded to civilian judges. Thus, the military judiciary endows soldiers with legal immunity from the civilian judiciary. The fact that the decisions of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) are not subject to judicial review is another major privilege. This council, formed by the top commanders, makes decisions about the future careers of military personnel. It can discharge military officers from the profession. These decisions cannot be reviewed.
Auditing of the military expenditure is another major sphere of autonomy. Financial audits cannot be applied to military units as they would be to other public institutions. There are still problems impeding audits by the Supreme Court of Accounts. Furthermore, the defense budget has de facto immunity from parliamentary review, which can also be viewed as autonomy. The defense minister is responsible for monitoring the budget prepared by the military in Parliament. This budget is approved by Parliament without being discussed.
In a nutshell, the military already has autonomy.
Interests of the military bureaucracy
The autonomy which the TSK already has, but of which more has been demanded by the chief of general staff, has nothing to do with the "requirements of the military profession." Since the military has created a military guardianship system through a series of military coups and since it has positioned itself above politics, it has injected this autonomy into the Constitution and laws. This autonomy smells of bureaucracy, not any justification for security. Having created an autonomous sphere within the state by using its weaponry, the military, as a bureaucratic institution, protects its institutional interests. Which "more professional and stronger" armies in developed countries are autonomous? What contribution will the autonomy that the United States and French militaries do not have make to our military?
Like all other administrative public institutions, the military is a bureaucratic institution. This bureaucratic institution is resisting threats to its bureaucratic interests. All bureaucratic institutions, in essence, try to protect themselves and obtain concessions. Since other bureaucratic public institutions do not have weapons, they lag behind the military in this respect. The military seeks to obtain privileges for its bureaucratic interests. What underlies the autonomy demand is the military's attempt to protect its bureaucratic interests.
Future of the military guardianship
All of the legislation that gives privileges to the military was a product of the military coups. Today, Turkey is trying to implement democratization reforms in order to restrict the privileged powers and authority of this autonomous military. A major step was to prevent the National Security Council (MGK) from exerting the military's influence on democratic governments. Recently, legal amendments limiting the sphere of activity of the military judiciary have abolished a major obstacle that would endow military personnel with immunity in the face of judicial review. These days, the TSK is quickly being taken within the limits of review that the militaries in democratic countries ordinarily face.
The seven-year term in office of a single-party government is a major factor in this stable democratization process. In the past, the cracks created by the competition among parties would work to strengthen the military's immunity. Here are two examples: The Republican People's Party (CHP) applied to the Constitutional Court requesting the cancellation of the legal amendments that removed military immunity from judicial review. When the military sided with the settlement with respect to the democratization initiative, which is Turkey's top agenda item, the opposition dragged the military into the matter to interfere with politics and issue political statements.
When the conjuncture dynamics in Turkey are viewed as a whole, there is a strong tendency to minimize the military guardianship. The Ergenekon trial will prevent the military from conducting psychological warfare against the nation using illegal means. Committing crimes in order to interfere with politics no longer appears to be an option. The termination of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism is dependent on the settlement of the Kurdish issue. When the Kurdish issue is settled, a major excuse used by the military for interfering with politics will be eliminated.
In short, the autonomy the military already has will be abolished and the military will turn into a bureaucratic institution functioning within democratic limits.
The "combat capability" is a political force. History tells us that when this force acts independently, it becomes completely useless, but damages its very own principles. The only force that links the popular will to strategic targets is a democratic government. A military seeking autonomy will reinforce its institutional bureaucratic interests, not the country's security.
This is well understood and shown by experience.
Benzer Haberler 
