Even if the heavens collapse

The Turkish position with regard to the occupation of Azerbaijani lands will not change. Will the Azerbaijani position with regard to Turkey’s right to live in peace and harmony with its neighbors do so?

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has repeated countless times that Turkey’s reconciliation with Armenia and the ending of the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land are two unrelated but mutually promoting processes. The better Turkish-Armenian relations are, the higher the chance of reaching an Azerbaijani-Armenian deal on the occupied Azerbaijani territories. If this logic is to be accepted as is, we have to conclude that whoever is not happy with Turkish-Armenian reconciliation is in fact not happy with the prospects of a finalization of the occupation.

Is it conceivable to think of an Azerbaijani leader opting for the continuation of the occupation? If it is conceivable to think of a Turkish leader, be it political or military, who wishes for the continuation of terrorism and separatist activity in the country, it is indeed. The Ergenekon junta taught us that there may be soldiers and politicians who see their interests in the continuation of the problems of the status quo. We have already seen projections of the Turkish Ergenekon in Azerbaijan. Certain Azerbaijani leaders may well be regarding the occupation as the basis of legitimacy for their offices.

Turkish-Armenian reconciliation is not simply a bi-national political process. It has to be perceived within the general framework of Turkey’s new foreign policy outlook and within the actual realities of post-Bush world politics. The prime parameters of the new Turkish foreign policy are set in accordance with Turkey’s European Union membership process and Professor Davutoğlu’s input. Parameters relating to Armenian reconciliation are Turkey’s willingness to apply a “zero problems with neighbors policy” and its readiness to “solve the frozen problems of the region in peaceful ways instead of adopting a military way to deal with them or to keep them frozen.” The second parameter complements the first.

Now, once it adopted the EU zero problems policy, Turkey had only two options: “To solve the problem with the use of force or to solve the problem peacefully.” The option for military action in zones of frozen conflict already proved fatal in the Georgian example. Frozen conflicts are also fragile conflicts. They have to be dealt with using the utmost care and patience.

Turks of Turkey have been living with the frozen conflicts of Transcaucasia for over a generation now. Russian incursions into Georgia and Azerbaijan have been regarded in Turkey as interference in Turkish domestic politics. The Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land was not abhorred in Turkey just because Turks and Azerbaijanis are two friendly nations. Turks regard their fate as linked to Transcaucasian conflicts. And for the first time in our recent history, Turkey is willing to change that fate toward an optimistic future. What is expected of Azerbaijan is fully fledged support and intellectual input, not declarations of mistrust and distaste.

Turks are natural-born conspiracy theorists. The apparent disturbance in Baku, resulting from a process that promises a change of the status quo, brings to mind a possible third party that is lobbying Azerbaijani foreign policy decision makers against Turkey’s evolving global role. That is pure speculation, of course, but I am concerned that there may be foreigners in Baku wandering from one bureaucratic office to another, instigating anti-Turkish sentiment there -- foreigners who are disturbed by Turkey’s new role in the region in particular and the world in general.